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1 – Introduction
Maritime  piracy  is  a  traditional  threat  to
maritime security.1 It has been a challenge for
mariners as long as ships have gone to sea.
In  ancient  times,  even  Julius  Caesar  was
captured and held for ransom by pirates.
Maritime  piracy  pose  substantial  risks  to
seaborne  trade,  with  considerable
commodities, ranging from raw materials and
energy to high-value manufactured products,
being  shipped  between  global  economic
powerhouses, like Western Europe and the
Far East through several of the world’s most
dangerous waterways, notably the Strait of
Malacca  and  the  Gulf  of  Aden.  These
waterways  are  often  geographically
constrained - narrow but strategically vital.
The widths of the Strait of Malacca and the
Gulf of Aden vary from 35 to 135 nautical
miles  and  from  13  to  175  nautical  miles,
respectively. Both chokepoints lie within the
‘hinterlands’ of piracy attacks. Their physical
landscapes, plus high volume of maritime
traffic, have made these chokepoints highly
vulnerable to piracy attacks.
The great number of incidents of piracy and
armed robbery against ships off the Somali
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ncreased maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia is affecting the delivery of food aid to
war torn Somalia. It is also creating a challenge to maritime trade and other maritime
economic opportunities. 
• Rerouting tankers carrying oil from the Gulf of Aden to the Cape of Good Hope costs
around $3.5 billion in annual fuel costs. 
• Increased insurance costs are passed on to consumers, making African products less
competitive.
• Maritime piracy is also affecting tourism and fishing. Reports indicate that for Seychelles
the cost of piracy alone stood at 4 percent of GDP in 2009. 
Piracy needs to be combated. A number of initiatives are being implemented by the United
Nations and regional economies. The Bank can contribute to combating piracy by raising
awareness of the impact through knowledge products and financial contribution to improve
port infrastructure and supporting the capacity building efforts led by IMO.
1 According the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (article 101) “Piracy consists
of any of the following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or
aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-paragraph (a) or (b).” 
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strategic  transit  point)  has  become  an
increasing concern not only for the maritime
industry but also to most African countries
as it threatens global seaborne trade and
maritime  economic  activities  for  African
countries  on  the  East  coast  of  the
continent.  Maritime  piracy  is  having  a
negative impact on the cost of shipping (for
merchandise trade and oil) and shipping
related  activities  (such  as  port  and
transshipment  activities),  tourism  and
fishing. By hijacking large tankers, seizing
their cargoes, and delaying or preventing
their delivery, piracy poses additional risks
and  costs  to  all.  The  implications  entail
increased military presence and operations
in affected areas, the re-routing of ships,
higher insurance premiums, and increased
costs  associated  with  hiring  security
personnel and the installation of deterrent
equipment.
The United Nations has also taken a special
interest because the deteriorating situation
off the war-torn Somalia and the Gulf of
Aden is affecting delivery of food aid to
Somalia. 
2 – Maritime Economic 
Opportunities
The  maritime  domain  provides  direct
economic  opportunities  to  a  number  of
African  countries  and  it  facilitates
international trade to merchandise goods
for  all  the  countries.  Maritime  related
activities such as shipping, port facilities,
tourism, fishing, oil and mineral harvesting
promote  economic  growth.  Maritime
economic activities take place both within
a country's exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
or beyond it. Specific laws and rights apply
to each situation. 
2.1 – Maritime Economic Opportunities
The  significant  dependence  of  African
countries  on  international  trade  makes
maritime transport a crucial factor in Africa’s
economic development. Maritime transport
provides a gateway to international markets
for Africa’s exports; port facilities play an
important  trade  facilitation  role  to
landlocked countries; fishing and tourism
are  important  sources  of  income  and
employment  to  littoral  and  island
economies; the sea is an important source
of oil, gas and minerals; and, the sea has
been used for connecting cables and pipes
for  data  services  and  mobile  telephone
connectivity. 
(i) Seaborne  Trade  –  The  continent  is
heavily  dependent  on  international
trade.  According  to  the  WTO
International  Trade  Statistics  (2010),
intra-Africa trade is about 11.5 percent
of total Africa trade. Therefore, the bulk
of  Africa’s  international  trade  (oil,
minerals and agricultural products) is
transported by sea. 
(ii) Port Services – Coastal countries earn
foreign  currency  by  providing  transit
services  to  landlocked  countries.
Countries  such  as  Egypt,  Kenya,
Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa,
Namibia, Cameron, Ghana and Nigeria
are key international gateways to the
continent’s  exports.  The  coastal
countries earn much needed foreign
currency from the port services they
provide.  For  example,  the  Nigerian
Maritime  Administration  and  Safety
Agency  (NIMASA),  has  recently
published a paper entitled “Nigeria as
an African Trade Hub” highlighting the
vast  opportunities  in  the  Nigerian
maritime sector to include ship building
and  ship  repairs,  human  capacity
development,  ship  breaking  and
recycle  facilities  amongst  others.  In
fact, besides being one of Africa’s most
important oil producers, Nigeria already
accounts for over 65 percent of the
total maritime trade traffic in volume
and value within the West and Central
African sub-region. Egypt also provides
vital trans-shipment services to trade
between Europe and Asia.
(iii) Fishing – According to the FAO, Africa's
fishing industry earned US$1.73 billion in
2007.2The industry also earns additional
income  through  fishing  licenses  to
foreign  operators.  Besides  being  the
main income-earning activity for many
Africans,  fish  also  provides  the  most
important  source  of  protein  to  the
majority  of  the  African  population,
playing a vital role in nutrition and food
security. Fish makes a vital contribution
to the food and nutritional security of 200
million Africans and provides income for
over 10 million.3
(iv) Tourism - Africa has a large untapped
tourism potential, and the industry has
the capacity to drive the continent's
growth. Tourism is a major source of
income to island economies such as
Seychelles and Mauritius. In addition to
tourists  who  come  directly  to  the
islands,  the  island  countries  also
benefit from stopovers and refueling
from cruise ships.
(v) Oil, gas and minerals - The upstream
oil industry in Africa is a key component
in the continent’s development. Africa
holds an estimated 117 billion-barrel of
oil  reserve,  corresponding  to  9.5
2 FAO Fishery and Aquaculture, Year Book (2007).
3 Erastus Mwencha a keynote address on "The Geostrategic Importance of Africa's Maritime Domain: Opportunities and Challenges" to an audience of African,
U.S. and European partners during the Maritime Safety and Security: Towards Economic Prosperity Conference October 13, 2010, at the Millennium Hotel
in Stuttgart, Germany (http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=5407&lang=0).percent of the world’s reserves, and
produces 12.6 percent of the world’s
output.  Five  countries  dominate  oil
production  (Nigeria,  Angola,  Libya,
Algeria and Egypt) and account for 85
percent of the continent’s production.
(vi) Submarine cables and pipes - Africa has
seen  a  surge  in  the  installation  of
intercontinental submarine cables that
aim to improve the region's connectivity.
This  has  created  new  business
opportunities ranging from provision of
data  services  and  mobile  telephony
services and has facilitated faster data
transfer.  For  example,  SEACOM’s
submarine cable is a fiber optic cable
providing high capacity bandwidth to
Southern Africa, East Africa, Europe,
and South Asia, went into commercial
operation in July 2009 after a delay of
four weeks, due to “enhanced pirate
activities”  on  the  route  taken  by  its
cable-laying  ships.  SEACOM's
enormous  capacity  will  enable  high
definition  TV,  peer  to  peer  networks,
IPTV, and surging Internet demand. The
other is the SAT-3/WASC (South Atlantic
3/West  Africa  Submarine  Cable)
submarine  communications  cable
linking  Portugal  and  Spain  to  South
Africa, with connections to several West
African  countries  along  the  route.  It
forms part of the SAT-3/WASC/SAFE
cable system, where the SAFE cable
links South Africa to Asia. A number of
other cables are also being planned for
Africa’s east and west coasts, and will
massively increase connectivity to the
region.
2.2 – Exclusive Economic Zones
The maritime activities are exploited within a
country’s EEZ. Under the ‘Law of the Sea’,
an EEZ is a sea zone over which a state has
special and sole exploitation rights over all
marine resources. The ‘Law of the Sea’ also
defines that landlocked countries should be
given the right of access to and from the
sea,  without  taxation  of  traffic  through
transit states. Foreign countries have the
freedom  of  navigation  and  over  flight,
subject  to  the  regulation  of  the  coastal
states.  Foreign  states  may  also  lay
submarine pipes and cables. 
A country's EEZ extends to a distance of
200 nautical miles (370 km) from its coast.
It  includes  territorial  waters,  contiguous
zone and continental shelf: 
Disputes  over  EEZs  occur  when  EEZs
overlap. For example, when two countries’
EEZs are less than 400 nautical miles (nm)
apart.  In  such  cases,  it  is  up  to  the
neighbouring states to delineate the actual
boundary. However, in practice any point
within an overlapping area tends to default
to the nearest state. They also occur when
countries want to extend their EEZs beyond
the established 200 nm.
2.3 – Extension of EEZs
Countries can make requests to extend their
EEZ to expand control and exploration of
maritime economic opportunities such as
minerals and oil. Requests for extension of
EEZs  must  be  submitted  to  the  UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf.  Nine  African  countries  have  either
made full or partial submissions to the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf  for  extensions  of  their  continental
shelves  beyond  200  nautical  miles.  The
countries  include  Ghana,  South  Africa,
Kenya, Mauritius (in the region of Rodrigues
Island), Seychelles (concerning the Northern
Plateau  Region),  Joint  submission  by
Mauritius and Seychelles (in the region of the
Mascarene Plateau), Cote d'Ivoire, Namibia,
Mozambique and Nigeria.4 However, none
of the submissions have yet been evaluated
by the Commission. 
Extensions of the ‘Continental shelf’ must
be based on geological evaluations, but are
usually  underpinned  by  economic
considerations, such as the possibility of
exclusively  exploring  mineral  and  oil
reserves located beyond 200 nm from the
countries'  coastlines.  For  example,
Nigeria’s National Boundary Commission
plans to extend the country’s EEZ by 150
nm. This would extend Nigeria’s maritime
boundary from its entitled 200 to 350 nm.
All ships coming through that area will come
under Nigeria’s authority, and the country
will be in control of all mineral exploitations
and fisheries resources.
3 – Maritime Piracy in Africa
Maritime economic opportunities in Africa
are increasingly being threatened by the
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4 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
Exclusive Economic Zones
‘Territorial waters’ is a zone that extends
12 nautical miles from the coast, and over
which the state is free to set laws, regulate
and use any resource. Vessels from other
countries are given the right of "innocent
passage", i.e. “passing through waters in
an expeditious and continuous manner not
prejudicial to peace, good order or security
of  the  coastal  state”.  Countries  can
temporarily suspend innocent passage in
specific  areas  of  their  territorial  sea  for
security reasons.
‘Contiguous zone’ is a zone that extends
a  further  12  nautical  miles  beyond  the
territorial waters, or 24 nautical miles from
the coast. Within the contiguous zone, a
state can continue to enforce laws with
respect to pollution, taxation, customs and
immigration.
‘Continental  shelf’ is  the  natural
prolongation of the land territory up to 350
nautical miles (648 km) from the coastal
baseline over which states also have the
exclusive  right  to  harvest  mineral  and
nonliving material in the subsoil.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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growing threat of maritime piracy. Until very
recently, maritime piracy has been largely
concentrated in Asia. However, in 2007, for
the  first  time  since  statistics  on  pirate
attacks  have  been  kept,  the  number  of
pirate  attacks  in  East  Africa  surpassed
those in Asian waters. This continued into
2009,  with  attacks  in  Africa  surpassing
those  in  Asia  by  far.  However,  reported
piracy attacks in East Africa slowed down
in 2010 while South China Sea experienced
a significant increase. 
Instances of piracy are monitored both by
the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
and by the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), which acts as a focal point in the fight
against  all  types  of  maritime  crime.
According to the IMO incidents of piracy and
armed attacks against shipping increased at
an  unprecedented  rate.  A  total  of  489
incidents were recorded by the IMO in 2010
compared to 406 in 2008 and 206 in 2008
(Graph 1). Most of the incidents occurred in
East Africa and South China Sea. 
Maritime  pirate  attacks  in  Africa  are
concentrated  in  Somalia  and  Nigeria.
However, the attacks are not limited to these
countries. According to the IMO, seventeen
other  littoral  countries  experienced  pirate
attacks during 2008-2010.5
3.1 – East Africa
The majority of incidents in maritime piracy
in East Africa are off the cost of Somalia.
Even though the first pirate attacks of any
significant number were only recorded in
2000, the roots of the current crisis date
back to 1991 when Mohammed Siad Barre
was  overthrown,  leaving  the  country
without an effective central government and
locked in civil conflict. Taking advantage of
the power vacuum, rival warlords carved
out influence over regional territories – first
on  land,  and  then  increasingly  at  sea.
Fishermen, dismayed at the inability of the
central  government  to  protect  their
country’s EEZ, and at the number of foreign
fishing  vessels  illegally  exploiting  their
traditional fisheries, took matters into their
own hands. Initially arming themselves to
chase off the illegal foreign fishing vessels,
they  quickly  realised  that  robbing  the
vessels was a lucrative way to make up for
lost  income.  Seeing  their  success,  land
based warlords co-opted some of the new
pirates, organising them into increasingly
sophisticated gangs.
The  year  2009  was  the  worst  in  pirate
attacks  in  East  Africa.  The  attacks  off
Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden rocketed
by over 250 per cent in 2009. Reported
incidents increased from 61 in 2008 to 222
in 2009 (Graph 1). A total of 48 vessels
were hijacked and 4 crew members were
killed. Incidents in East Africa are mainly in
international waters (Graph 2). Out of the
222 reported incidents in 2009, 204 were
in international waters. 
Kenya and Tanzania are also affected by
piracy but not anywhere near the levels seen
off the coast of Somalia. According to IMO,
many of the pirate attacks reported in these
two  countries  are  actually  committed  by
Somali pirates operating farther and farther
from their territorial waters. Somali pirates
can now sail as far as 250-400 nm away
from coastlines to launch an attack.6 For
example, the Sirius Star was captured off the
Kenyan coast while the Maersk Alabama
was  attacked  en  route  to  Mombasa.  An
attempt on a Dutch container ship was over
500 nm east of Dar es Salaam.
Increased presence security in the Gulf of
Eden led to a decline in incidents off the cost
of  Somalia.  IMO  reports  show  that  the
number of reported pirate attacks in East
Africa decreased from 222 in 2009 to 172 in
2010. Out of the 172 attacks, 168 were in
international  waters,  2  were  in  territorial
waters and 2 in port area. While most of the
attacks occurred off the cost of Somalia and
the  Gulf  of  Aden,  isolated  attacks  were
reported on a fishing vessel in Seychelles
international  waters;  Dar  es  Salaam
Anchorage; north of Zanzibar Island; south
east  of  Port  of  Mombasa;  east  of  Lindi
(Tanzania); east of Pemba Islands (Tanzania);
north  west  of  Zanzibar  Island;  and
Mozambique Channel (off Madagascar). 
5 The countries include Angola, Cameroon, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya,
Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Togo.
6 D.M. Zogg (2009). Why the US navy should not be fighting piracy off Somalia. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
Source: International Maritime Organisation.
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3.2 – West Africa
Incidents of maritime piracy in West Africa
occur mainly in Nigeria. They are directly
linked to oil production in the Niger Delta.
Some pirates claim to be fighting for a fairer
distribution of Nigeria’s vast oil wealth, and
as a protest to the damage caused by oil
production  in  the  Delta.  The  cost  of
maritime piracy to Nigerian society and the
economy have been significant, not only to
the oil industry, but to local fisheries and
regional trade as well.
Incidents of piracy and armed robbery in
West Africa increased from 42 in 2008 to 46
in 2009 and to 47 in 2010 (Graph 1). Unlike
the attacks in East Africa, most of the attacks
in West Africa occurred in territorial waters
while the ships were at anchor or berthed
(Graph 2). Other countries that are affected
by  maritime  piracy  and  robbery  in  West
Africa,  even  though  not  to  the  extent  of
Nigeria, are Cameroon (Douala Anchorage),
Cote  d’Ivoire  (Abidjan  Anchorage),  Pointe
Noire  Anchorage  (Congo),  Liberia  and
Guinea (Conakry). Most of the incidents are
theft that happen in port area and are due to
poor port security. 
4 – Impact of Maritime Piracy
Maritime piracy imposes direct costs on
humanitarian assistance and has an impact
on maritime economic activities such as oil
production and cost of energy, insurance
and shipping costs, tourism and fishing. 
4.1 – Humanitarian Assistance 
to Somalia
Maritime  piracy  impedes  the  delivery  of
relief aid necessary to sustain and nourish a
substantial  part  of  the  population  of
Somalia. Civil war, combined with a series
of devastating droughts, has created a dire
humanitarian crisis in Somalia. There are
more than one million internally displaced
persons in the country. According to the
World Food Programme (WFP), more than
2.6  million  people  in  Somalia  were
dependent on food aid in 2008; the number
now stands at 3.25 million people. 
Between 80 and 90 per cent of food aid for
Somalia arrives by sea. In 2007 the WFP
reported that the number of ships willing to
carry food aid to Somalia had been cut by
half  because  of  the  increased  dangers
faced  by  humanitarian  relief  vessels  in
Somali waters.7 Ship owners fear that their
vessels would be seized by pirates and their
crews held for ransom. In response, seven
NATO  warships  were  deployed  off  the
Somali coast as part of ‘Operation Allied
Provider’  to  help  combat  piracy,  and
specifically to protect the WFP.8
4.2 – Oil Production and Cost 
of Energy
Threats to energy security from maritime
piracy are a concern. In November 2008,
the Sirius Star carrying two million barrels
of  crude  oil  from  Saudi  Arabia  to  the
United States (worth approximately $100
million) became the largest oil tanker to be
seized  by  pirates.  It  was  held  for  two
months until being released upon payment
of a ransom. 
The attack was of particular concern for
two reasons: 
• First, other than being the largest energy
vessel  ever  hijacked,  it  was  also  the
largest  vessel  of  any  kind  ever  taken
hostage. Additionally, it was considerably
farther offshore than the Somali pirates
had ever operated; it is estimated that the
pirates must have travelled three to four
days out on sea to intercept the vessel.
The attack showed that the pirates were
able to operate in an area of over one
million  square  miles,  well  beyond  the
reach of the international patrols in the
Gulf of Aden.
• Second,  because  of  the  nature  of  the
cargo,  there  was  concern  that  the
hijacking might represent an escalation in
the goals and ambitions of the pirates. An
Source: International Maritime Organisation.
Graph 2 Location of Incidents and Status of Ship
Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships
Location of Incidents (2008-2010)
7 Coordinated action urged: piracy threatens UN lifeline to Somalia, 7 October 2007, World Food Programme, http://www.wfp.org.
8 Horn of Africa crisis, World Food Programme regional alert, 3 February 2009, http://www.wfp.org.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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oil  tanker  of  this  size  could  cause
significant environmental damage if run
aground, sunk or set on fire. 
More than 10 percent of all seaborne oil
passes through the Gulf of Aden to the Suez
Canal. The alternate route, traveling around
the  southern  tip  of  Africa,  is  significantly
longer and more expensive. Routing a single
tanker  from  Saudi  Arabia  to  the  United
States around the Cape of Good Hope adds
approximately 2,700 miles to each voyage
and about $3.5 million in annual fuel costs.
This could have an impact on shipping costs
for imported raw materials and oil. 
As world attention focused on the striking
increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and
dramatic hijackings such as the Sirius Star,
the piracy situation in Nigeria was relatively
neglected.  IMO  reports  show  that  2009
began with the capture of an oil supply
vessel and a subsequent attack on a Royal
Dutch Shell tanker. Reports show that on
21 January 2010 militants from the Niger
Delta region attacked the MT Meredith, a
tanker carrying 4,000 tons of diesel fuel,
and kidnapped a Romanian crew-member
(released a day later). 
As a result of pirate attacks on vessels
and  other  incidents,  oil  production  in
Nigeria is estimated to have dropped by
20  per  cent  since  2006  costing  the
Nigerian  economy  US$202  million
between 2006 and 2008.9
4.3 – Tourism and Fishing
Maritime  piracy  also  imposes  significant
costs on local fishing economies. According
to IMO, pirates attacked tuna vessels at least
three times in 2009 as they fished 650 to
800  kilometers  beyond  Somali  territorial
waters. One vessel was captured, leading to
a  ransom  payment  that  exceeded  US$1
million.  The  threat  of  pirate  attacks  has
prompted many vessels to avoid some of
the richest fishing spots in the Indian Ocean.
Dwindling catches have raised concern that
the  Seychelles  and  Mauritius  could  face
severe economic problems.
The Seychelles chain's economic survival
depends not just on its enduring appeal to
tourists but to a greater extent on the fishing
industry.  The  Somali  pirates  are  a  direct
threat to both. Seychelles has 1.4 million
square kilometers of ocean as part of its EEZ
and  115  islands.  Tourism  and  fisheries
account for 65 percent of the country’s GDP,
employs 36% of the country’s workforce.
Tuna  and  related  industries,  through  re-
export  of  fuel  to  vessels,  port  services,
electricity and water for vessels account for
up to 40 percent of foreign earnings. It has
been estimated that the cost of piracy alone
(not accounting other threats to maritime
activities such as pollution, illegal trade, etc)
stood at approximately 4 percent of GDP in
2009.10
The threat of piracy has also led to reduced
cruise ships which contribute to tourism in
the  island  countries  of  Mauritius  and
Seychelles. The Kenyan Cruise Ship industry
has also suffered from the effects of piracy
and fewer ships dock in Mombasa. 
Fishing is the second highest non-oil export
industry in Nigeria, and pirate attacks on
fishing trawlers have reached the point that
many fishing boat captains refuse to sail.
Nigeria stands to lose up to US$600 million
in export earnings due to piracy threats to
its fisheries.11
4.4 – Cost of Shipping and Insurance
The dramatic rise of piracy in the Gulf of
Aden is changing the insurance landscape.
While piracy is not a new insured risk, the
increase in pirate attacks along the Gulf has
affected  premiums  and  coverage.  Ships
that continue to pass through the Gulf of
Aden and the Suez Canal have to purchase
a war risk insurance coverage. According
to a recent report by UNCTAD, insurance
premiums for ships traveling through the
Gulf have rose from between 0.05% and
0.175%  of  the  value  of  their  cargo,
compared to between 0% and 0.05% in
May  2008.  Premiums  for  kidnap  and
ransom coverage have reportedly increased
by as much as 1,000%.12 The additional
costs  due  to  piracy  are  passed  on  to
consumers as shipping companies recoup
most of their losses through their protection
and indemnity clauses.13
An  increasing  number  of  ships  are  now
avoiding the Suez Canal route and taking
the longer route around the Cape of Good
Hope. Denmark's A.P. Moller-Maersk, one
of  the  world's  largest  shipping  lines,  is
routing some of its 50 oil tankers around the
Cape of Good Hope instead of through the
Suez  Canal,  and  the  Norwegian  firm
Frontline, a major carrier of Middle Eastern
oil, may follow suit. Naturally, taking the
much longer route around the Cape adds
both time and expense to each shipment.
Diverting from the canal to the Cape on a
trip from the Middle East to refineries in the
Mediterranean  doubles  typical  transport
time  from  15  to  30  days.  This  naturally
9 G. Akinsanmi, Nigeria: nation loses N25bn to piracy, sea robberies, Allafrica.com, http://allafrica.com
10 http://www.statehouse.gov.sc/
11 O. Gabriel, G. Bivbere and I. Ugwuadu, Renewed piracy attacks: fish scarcity looms, Nigeria may lose $600m export earnings, The Vanguard, 1 June 2008,
www.vanguardngr.com.
12 UNCTAD (2009). Review of Maritime Transport.
13 See Michael Baker (http://www.cfr.org/publication/22465/building_african_partnerships_to_defeat_piracy.html).A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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would lead to an increase in commodities
transport fees to more than 30 percent and
lower competitiveness of traders especially
for perishables goods and time (fashion)
sensitive  goods  such  as  clothing.  It  is
estimated  that  an  extra  US$7.5  billion
would be triggered per year if one-third of
the  Far  East-Europe  cargoes  were
geographically re-routed via the Cape of
Good Hope involving an extra 15 to 30
days to finish the service moving with the
same knots.14
Egypt  benefits  from  its  geographical
position, and from the Suez Canal, which
forms part of the world’s busiest shipping
route, connecting Europe and Asia. Re-
routing via the Cape of Good Hope will likely
affect  the  Egyptian  authorities  (loss  of
foreign currency earnings), the Suez Canal
Authorities (loss of operating earnings and
employment),  Mediterranean  port
authorities  and  terminals  (e.g.  reduced
vessel calls and trans-shipments), and also
industry  and  consumers  because  of
additional costs.
Nigeria accounts for over 65 per cent of the
total seaborne traffic for 16 countries in
West Africa. As warnings to mariners in and
near  Nigerian  waters  become  more
common,  increased  shipping  costs  for
Nigerian and Gulf of Guinea destinations are
likely  as  shippers  begin  to  factor  higher
insurance premiums into their pricing.
5 – Measures to Deal 
with Maritime Piracy 
The increase in acts of piracy has led to
enhanced cooperation at international and
regional levels. Joint efforts are being made
in various forums to find adequate solutions
to piracy.
5.1 – Capacity Building by IMO
In  2009  the  IMO’s  Maritime  Safety
Committee approved revised guidance to
operators: “Recommendations to Govern  -
ment for preventing and suppressing piracy
and  armed  robbery  against  ships’  and
“Guidance  to  ship  owners  and  ship
operators,  shipmasters  and  crews  on
preventing and suppressing acts of piracy
and armed robbery against ships.”15 The
Committee  also  agreed  that  a  specific
“Guidance on piracy and armed robbery
against  ships  in  waters  off  the  coast  of
Somalia”  should  include  “Best  manage  -
ment practices to deter piracy in the Gulf of
Aden and off the coast of Somalia” which
was developed by industry organisations.
As  part  of  its  technical  cooperation
programme, IMO is assisting countries to
build capacity, so that they can effectively
contribute  to  overall  efforts  to  combat
piracy, including through relevant national
legislations.
5.2 – Regional Cooperation 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct
In 2009 a high-level meeting of 17 countries
from  the  Western  Indian  Ocean,  Gulf  of
Aden and Red Sea areas met in Djibouti and
adopted a “Code of conduct concerning the
repression  of  piracy  and  armed  robbery
against ships in the Western Indian Ocean
and the Gulf of Aden”. Signatories to the
code of conduct to undertake wide-ranging
commitments  to  cooperate  in  seizing,
investigating and prosecuting pirates in the
region, and to review their relevant national
laws.  The  code  of  conduct  allows
authorized officials to board the patrol ships
or  aircraft  of  another  signatory.  Nine
countries have so far signed the code of
conduct. These include: Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya,  Madagascar,  the  Maldives,  the
Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, and Yemen.
5.3 – International Cooperation United 
Nations
Recognizing the seriousness of maritime
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations has called for
a  multifaceted  approach  to  combating
piracy “to ensure that the political process
and the peacekeeping efforts of the African
Union and the strengthening of institutions
work in tandem”.16
The United Nations Security Council has
been  actively  engaged  in  formulating
adequate responses to the issue of piracy.
Several  UN  Security  Council  resolutions
have been adopted to address the delivery
of  humanitarian  aid  to  Somalia  and  the
protecting and escorting ships employed by
the  World  Food  Programme.  In  January
2009 the Security Council (resolution 1851)
established the contact Group on Piracy off
the Coast of Somalia to facilitate discussion
and coordination of actions among states
and organizations to suppress piracy off the
coast  of  Somalia.  The  contact  group
periodically reports progress to the Security
Council. 
In  support  of  UN  Security  Council
resolution  1851  and  the  EU-NAVFOR
Somalia set up in 2008 to improve maritime
security off the Somali coast, the European
Union  has  established  the  Maritime
Security Centre (Horn of Africa) as part of
international efforts to coordinate efforts to
deal with piracy. The Centre is part of the
European  Security  and  Defence  Policy
Initiative  which  provides  a  service  to
mariners in the region.17
14 M. Nakamura (2009). Piracy off the Horn of Africa: what is the most effective method of repression? Naval War College, Newport, R.I.
15 http://docs.imo.org
16 The matter of piracy off Somalia was first brought to the attention of the Security Council by the IMO in 2005.
17 Detailed information is provided on http://www.mschoa.org.A f r i c a n   D e v e l o p m e n t   B a n k
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6 – Role of the Bank 
in Combating Piracy 
The  impact  on  sea  borne  trade  and
maritime  economic  opportunities  pose
serious challenges to Africa’s development
agenda. The Bank can play an important
part in combating piracy. 
6.1 – Producing Knowledge Products
During the US Africa Command-organised
maritime  security  conference  in  October
2010,  the  AU  Commission  deputy
chairman Erastus Mwencha underscored
that “the leading threat to Africa’s maritime
domain  however  remains  the  threat  of
ignorance.  Until  there  is  a  true  under  -
standing of the geostrategic importance of
Africa’s maritime domain for Africa’s socio-
economic development growth, until there
is a true understanding of how central it is
for the wellbeing and prosperity of millions
of Africans, the scope and magnitude of all
the  afore  mentioned  threats  and
vulnerabilities  will  continue  to  grow  and
undermine  Africa’s  socio-economic
development growth”. 
The Bank could monitor and report on the
impact of piracy. Such knowledge products
could raise awareness of the importance of
maritime  security  to  Africa’s  economic
growth  and  the  seriousness  of  maritime
piracy to economic growth in Africa. The
Bank can work closely with the IMO which
records incidents of piracy. 
6.2 – Contributing Financial Resources 
for Fighting Piracy
The Bank should support the African Union
(AU) in the development of an integrated
maritime strategy to serve as a long-term
multi-layered common vision to addressing
seaborne  challenges  and  sustain  more
wealth creation from the oceans and seas.
The long term solution to the problem of
piracy off the coast of Somalia is through
the creation of economic opportunities so
that  the  youth  could  be  meaningfully
employed. The Bank can also contribute to
capacity building efforts led by IMO. 
6.3 – Improvements in Port Security
Michael  Baker  observes  that  shipping
companies  send  smaller,  older,  and
cheaper ships to Africa because the ports
cannot handle modern fleets.18 As a result
shipping companies deploy their remaining
smaller and slower ships for transport to
and from Africa, increasing the number of
easy  targets  for  pirates  and  further
impeding Africa’s ability to export products
efficiently. 
The  Bank  can  contribute  by  increasing
resources to improve port infrastructure. 
18 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66762/michael-lyon-baker/swapping-pirates-for-commerce
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